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1. Introduction 
In the mid-1990s, the Dutch economy grew at a pace of 3 to 4 percent annually (CBS, 2009). 
The use of the country's major infrastructure increased accordingly, and the urban areas in 
the western part of the country, the Randstad, continued to expand to meet the soaring 
housing demand. After decades of state intervention, the government started to loosen its 
grip on local and regional urban development. The government's policy on spatial planning 
shifted away from the concept of planning new towns to focus on more compact urban 
development (compacte stad). The policy reasoned that a compact city would have a smaller 
environmental footprint because of more effective land-use and shorter daily travel 
distances. With its Fourth Report on Spatial Planning (VROM, 1988: Vierde Nota) and the 
additional VINEX-report (VROM, 1993: Vierde Nota Extra), the Ministry of Spatial 
Planning, Housing and the Environment no longer seemed to dictate that one solution that 
fits all. Rather, it sought to implement developments that suited the regional territorial 
characteristics and the preferences of the concerned authorities. Thus, Utrecht ended up 
with the largest VINEX-development in the Netherlands. In fact, Utrecht is the fourth 
largest city by population in the country, after Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. 
Although the concept of the 'compact city' may be simple, it had deep implications for the 
relation between infrastructure planning and town planning. Back in the seventies and 
eighties two major new town developments were built south of Utrecht to house its 
expanding population. The physical distance between the mother city and its new towns 
allowed the unobstructed expansion of the national motorway network. In the nineties 
Utrecht preferred a development that kept its inhabitants close by so they would remain 
bounded to Utrecht, both economically and socially. The development of Leidsche Rijn with 
a projected 30.000 housing units sought a close physical relationship with the mother city. 
For the first time the extending city and the expanding motorway network became at odds 
with each other. The area between Utrecht and Leidsche Rijn left little space to 
accommodate a wider A2 motorway and its environmental impact. Encapsulating the A2 
motorway in a two kilometre long tunnel was proposed as the most suitable way to 
integrate the road in the new urban district. With no effective regulation in place and no 
similar practice to fall back on, the Leidsche Rijn land tunnel broke ground to allow the use 
of motorway tunnels for a new and promising application: environmental and spatial 
integration of motorways in urban areas. This chapter focusses on the struggle and trade 
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offs in the adjustment between spatial planning and infrastructure planning in one of the 
key urban development projects in the Netherlands: Leidsche Rijn. 
 
Fig. 1. Aerial photo of the Landtunnel Utrecht. (Gerry Hurkmans, 2009). 
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2. Outline 
This chapter deals with the growing tension between the necessity to widen the Randstad's 
motorway network and its urban footprint. It poses the question how to integrate large scale 
infrastructure in urban areas. This design/engineering/planning task requires a 
multidisciplinary approach, combining insights drawn from urban and spatial planning, 
civil engineering, safety assessment, environmental impact assessment and governance. 
Because most foreign readers aren't familiar with the topography and the spatial 
development of the western part of the Netherlands three key areas are highlighted first: the 
Randstad, the Green Heart and Leidsche Rijn. This sets the stage for explaining why 
Leidsche Rijn is a good indicator for the changes occurring in the leading concepts of urban 
planning, spatial planning and infrastructure planning in the Netherlands. It allows the 
discussion of the main concept of the Leidsche Rijn in order to explain why the city wanted 
to integrate the A2-corridor in the urban development. That integration had deep 
consequences for the physical shape of that road as it required the construction of a major 
road tunnel. As soon as the concept for a tunnel was embraced by the local and regional 
governments the deal started to unravel under pressure safety concerns, voiced by the 
national government. The safety of the users of the tunnel and the safety of those that would 
live or work next to it seemed at risk. At this point the chapter moves into an 
interdisciplinary area where only a few specialist speaks each others professional language. 
Due to a lack of mutual understanding between politicians, urban planners, safety 
assessment officers and transport planners the project moved in to a deadlock which took 
years to resolve. 
The storyline is based on the review of many of the relevant policy documents and plans 
written in the Dutch language on this matter, on in depth interviews with key players in the 
process and the various environmental and safety assessments. The final form of this 
chapter is that of a rigorous multidisciplinary case study. 
3. Randstad and Green Heart 
Utrecht is one of the four Dutch cities that jointly constitute the Randstad. The Randstad is 
the framework commonly used to describe the densely populated western part of the 
Netherlands. In the mid 1960s that Randstad was discovered by academics from the Anglo-
Saxon world as an alternative model for metropolitan growth. For London, in particular, 
struggling to contain its large continuous urban area, by the so-called Green Belt, the 
Randstad seem to demonstrate that a large urban population could be organised in a 
networked polycentric configuration, and function well at the same time. That idea 
appealed to writers like Gerald L. Burke (Burke, 2006) and Peter Hall (Hall, 1966, 1977, 
1983). The Randstad was seemingly less congested than a classic metropolis and possessed 
an invaluable asset: the Green Heart. 
The simple concept of a large green area surrounded by a ring shaped conurbation settled 
quickly in the minds of students, practitioners and academics alike. It also helped to place 
Holland on the map and that seemed necessary. In 1966 Gerald L. Burke already noted that 
although The Netherlands is known for its city planning, "less widely known are the policies 
of regional planning which have been developed in the Netherlands since World War II" 
(Burke, 2006). 
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When Gerald L. Burke wrote his book he referred to the brand new Second Report on Spatial 
Planning (V&RO, 1966) and to the documents that preceded it. In the late fifties the 
Netherlands started to formulate its national spatial planning agenda. The 'Working 
Committee on the Western part of the Country' produced in 1958 its report including the 
famous plan for the 'schematic structure of the urban ring', a conceptual vision on the spatial 
structure of Randstad (Berveas et al, 2001). At the end of the fifties it became clear that the 
Green Heart was being threatened by (sub)urbanisation. Especially the open zones in between 
the larger cities on the urban ring were at risk. The 'Working Committee on the Western part 
of the Country' advised to keep the cities in the ring structure separated, both functionally and 
spatially. The strategy was to apply designated buffer zones between the urban areas and to 
plan new cities on the outside of the ring as opposed of the inside the ring (in the Green 
Heart). An increasing set of sophisticated instruments was used to preserve these formal 
buffers, ranging from land acquisition to legislation (Bervaes et al, 2001). Time was to prove 
that these buffer zones would be more robust than the Green Heart itself. 
 
Fig. 2. Green buffer zone (Arend van Dam, 2008) 
As soon as the Dutch government adopted the Green Heart concept that same government 
began two other initiatives that were in direct contradiction to the idea to maintain the 
Green Heart as an open space. The first initiative was the publication of the structure plan 
for the national motorway network in 1966 (Dutch: Structuurschema Hoofdwegennet 1966). 
It proposed the rollout of a dense grid of motorways over much of The Netherlands - 
including the Green Heart - where ten (!) additional motorways were planned. Secondly, it 
developed and adopted the 'groeikern' approach. Groeikern (growth municipality) is the 
Dutch equivalent of the British 'new town' and the French 'ville nouvelle’ policies. The 
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Dutch government decided to focus urban growth in a limited number of municipalities to 
give these a specified quantitative task to increase their housing stock, and subsequently 
their population and urban area.  
 
Fig. 3. Structure plan national motorway network 1966 (V&RO, 1966) 
4. Third and Forth Report on Spatial Planning 
The 'growth municipalities' entered officially the planning stage at the time of the Third 
Report on Spatial Planning (V&RO, 1976, 1977). A steep increase of the number of 
inhabitants in a part of these municipalities can already be traced back a decade earlier. 
Some of the 'grow municipalities' turned into independent towns; some of them were 
merely the extension of the larger agglomerations. The Third Report listed eleven official 
'growth municipalities'. Each of the four larger cities in the Randstad was outfitted with at 
least one 'growth municipality' that was firmly situated in the area that was still considered 
to be an integral part of the Green Heart: Hoofddorp in the Amsterdam region, Zoetermeer 
in The Hague region, Capelle aan den IJssel in the Rotterdam region and Nieuwegein in the 
Utrecht region. Most of the roads that were foreseen in the 1966 structure plan for the 
national motorway network never made it off the drawing board. Motorway construction 
still made a significant impact on the Green Heart with the construction of the A2 
(Amsterdam - Utrecht - Den Bosch), the A4 (Amsterdam - The Hague), the A20 (Rotterdam - 
Gouda), the A67 (Hilversum - Utrecht - Breda), the N11 (Leiden - Bodegraven) and to a 
lesser extend also the A1 (Amsterdam - Hilversum). 
The Forth Report on Spatial Planning (VROM, 1988) and its extended version called VINEX 
(VROM, 1993) abandoned the 'growth municipality' strategy and introduced the so-called 
VINEX-extensions. The VINEX-extensions, with its new residential areas at Noordrand 
(Rotterdam), Ypenburg (The Hague) and Oosterheem (Zoetermeer) and Leidsche Rijn 
(Utrecht) pushed the envelop of the Green Heart further inwards. No new motorways were 
planned but most of the existing roads would be widened. At the turn of the century, after 
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four decades of spatial planning, the overall concept of how the urban areas, open spaces 
and infrastructure of the Randstad related to each other had fundamentally changed. 
Fig. 4. The shrinking boundaries of the Green Heart (Pieterse et al, 2005) 
5. Leidsche Rijn 
Leidsche Rijn is one of the most prominent products of the VINEX-report and reflects much 
of the developments that took place elsewhere in the Randstad. Leidsche Rijn expands the 
city of Utrecht (313.000 inhabitants) with 20 to 30.000 housing units, a large urban park and 
even larger employment areas. The development annexes the villages of Vleuten en De 
Meern. By doing so it almost doubles the urban footprint of the municipality of Utrecht. The 
larger Utrecht region had developed according a decentralised poly-centric model using 
new towns to accommodate the demand for high quality living in the region. It was a 
response to the concern that cities would become too large, too congested, too polluted. The 
Utrecht region witnessed the construction of two successful new towns: Nieuwegein (61.000 
inhabitants) and Houten (48.000 inhabitants), separated from mother city Utrecht by a 
orbital motorway. Houten became a poster-boy for sustainable transport with its clever 
combination of transit-oriented development and a sophisticated bicycle network. The 
construction of the motorway network that connected the various cities and towns in the 
decentralised Randstad infrastructure didn't pose any difficulties for development of 
Nieuwegein and Houten. Motorways were in the 1970s still lean and mean. Their 
environmental impact was limited while the space between Utrecht and its new towns was 
superfluous. 
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Leidsche Rijn, conceived two decades later, signals in many respects a clear break from 
previous spatial planning concepts. Leidsche Rijn is based on the compact city concept. That 
city model assumes that keeping distances within urban regions short will result in 
environmental benefits through reduced travel(time) and more effective land use. Keeping 
new developments close to Utrecht meant that city had to develop westwards into the area 
that was an integral part of the Green Heart since that concept was coined. The Fourth 
Report on Spatial Planning adjusted the planning border of that Green Heart to allow the 
development of Hollands largest greenfield development. The ambition to minimise the 
distance between Leidsche Rijn meant furthermore that the urban development had to make 
effective use of the space along the A2 motorway, space that would normally be leftover due 
to the environmental footprint caused by noise, air pollution and risks. Because the capacity 
of the A2 was insufficient, the road had to be widened from 2x3 lanes to 2x5 lanes. Both 
projects, extending Utrecht and extending the A2 corridor had to take place in one 
integrated development project. 
6. Masterplan Leidsche Rijn 
In the early 1990s, a young urban planning firm received the commission to develop a 
master plan for Utrecht's new VINEX development Leidsche Rijn. The office was by then 
know as Max 1, currently as Maxwan. Maxwan proposed a different direction than most 
urban planners tended to pursue. Usually planners pay close attention to the environmental 
constraints of a site and use them as a starting point, trying to keep housing and other soft 
functions (such as education and care facilities) at a secure distance from major arteries or 
other producers of noise, air pollution and safety issues. This explains why in the Dutch 
practice green spaces are often used to fill up the gap between infrastructure and residential 
areas. But as a result, those green spaces often end up fragmented, noisy, polluted and not 
well suited to the recreational purposes that green spaces are mostly associated with.  
 
Fig. 5. Leidsche Rijn with (left) and without (right) a tunnel solution (Maxwan, 2009) 
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Maxwan proposed to implement an innovative approach, like shifting the course of the 
motorway while at the same time tunnelling it. The company received that approval, and in 
1995 delivered its Masterplan Leidsche Rijn, commissioned by the City of Utrecht. 
Therefore, the city of Utrecht proposed its Master Plan Leidsche Rijn to contain the noise 
and air pollution of the A2 motorway with a two-kilometre tunnel situated a few hundred 
meters from its original alignment in 1995 (Projectbureau Leidsche Rijn, 1995). The tunnel 
was partly suppressed with the assumption that a tunnel in the local soft soil conditions 
(with a high ground water level) would be cheaper to build as a 'floating construction' than 
as a submerged tunnel or as a full-fledged land tunnel. In addition, a suppressed tunnel is 
beneficial because it does not function as a barrier between the existing city of Utrecht and 
the new Leidsche Rijn development. Encapsulating the motorway allowed Maxwan to built 
housing and city centre functions next to the motorway. This allowed to plan a large urban 
park right at the heart of the development site where all residents could easily access it and 
not be burdened by noise or air pollution. 
7. Safety concerns and the project’s first revision 
Not long after the Masterplan Leidsche Rijn proposed its tunnel solution, concerns were 
voiced regarding the internal and external safety of the Landtunnel Utrecht that was such an 
integral part of the overall Master Plan Leidsche Rijn. Safety experts from the Construction 
Department of the Directorate General for Public Works and Water Management (part of the 
overall Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management) pointed out that 
constructing a tunnel in the A2 would violate the existing rules and regulations for the 
transportation of dangerous goods, especially the transport of liquid flammable gasses, a 
category that contains predominately Liquefied Petrol Gas or LPG (Rijkswaterstaat 
Bouwdienst, 1996). 
The Netherlands had many road tunnels by the late 20th century, and the majority were 
motorway tunnels that crossed one of the many waterways in the delta of the Rhine and 
Meuse rivers. Compared to tunnels in the mountainous parts of Europe, these tunnels are 
short in length. The fully enclosed sections of these tunnels often measure less than 
thousand metres. On the other hand, these tunnels tend to be rather wide. Tunnels with four 
lanes in each direction are not the exceptions. Their vulnerability does not stem from their 
length, but from the large volume of traffic that uses them and from their strategic position 
under water. 
The general rule in the Netherlands is that all transportation of dangerous goods occurs on 
the motorway network because motorways provide higher levels of road safety. There is an 
exception to this rule. When a tunnel can be bypassed by using a bridge, then the use of that 
bridge is preferable. The bridge should be used, even if it increases the external risk for local 
inhabitants. This exception exists because of the economic risks involved in losing a tunnel. 
A scenario that includes the transport of dangerous goods could develop into an accident 
that could effectively put a tunnel permanently out of use. A truck carrying LPG could 
cause a problem such as a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE). Although 
the chance that such a scenario develops may be remote, the possible impact of the scenario 
is devastating and, therefore, poses a considerable risk (Molag, 1998). It is unrealistic to 
expect that an underwater tunnel damaged in such an event could be repaired. It would 
become necessary to build a new one. Such a scenario could leave the Rotterdam Harbour, 
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for instance, without a decent road connection for a period of four years. The indirect 
economic damage would be so extensive that the ministry is not willing to take any chances. 
Thus, it banned the transportation of the most damaging dangerous goods from its tunnels 
(Directie Transportveiligheid, 1997). The multifunctional tunnel at Leidsche Rijn seemed to 
violate this regulation. The development of the Leidsche Rijn project, however, was in such 
an advanced stage that simply banning the tunnel was no longer feasible politically. A 
different solution had to be developed. 
In response to the safety concerns regarding the transport of dangerous goods, the Ministry 
of Transport, Public Works and Water Management opted to replace the full tunnel with a 
series of three shorter tunnels. This would reduce the impact of the most extreme 
anticipated scenarios on the A2 motorway users. Shorter tunnels contain fewer people, thus 
reducing the maximum number of potential causalities. The Ministry also opposed the idea 
of a 'floating tunnel' along a new alignment. The idea was not considered technically 
feasible. A fully submerged tunnel was out of the question because of the high ground water 
level that increases the cost to build such a structure. The construction of aboveground 
tunnels next to the current A2 emerged as the preferable solution.  
The tight integration between urban development and road expansion required the Master 
Plan to be adjusted. Breaking up the tunnel meant that the environmental impact of the 
motorway would be felt in the area, noise and air pollution would be especially prominent. 
Raising the roof of the tunnel to a level of 6.5 metres above the surrounding area meant that 
the tunnel would function as a physical barrier. A preliminary concept responding to these 
issues, the Creative Alternative Integration A2 / Leidsche Rijn, was subsequently included 
in a revised master plan: the Ontwikkelingsvisie Leidsche Rijn Utrecht (Projectbureau 
Leidsche Rijn, 1996). It became the first major revision of the Masterplan and the tunnel 
concept. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Creative Alternative: cross-sections (Maxwan, 1998). 
The 'Creative Alternative’ consisted of three short tunnels, measuring 450 m, 408 m and 188 
m. The Ministry did not allow housing to be built on top of these sections; instead, the area 
is designated for recreational purposes. Noise barriers would have to be used to reduce the 
environmental impact along the open sections. 
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Fig. 7. Creative Alternative: alignment (Maxwan, 1998). 
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Fig. 8. The Creative Alternative with horizontal cantilevers (Maxwan, 1998). 
In 1998, the Projectbureau Leidsche Rijn published an additional investigation into the 
requirements to integrate the A2 in Leidsche Rijn from an urban perspective (Maxwan, 
1998). The project bureau’s objective was to optimise the Creative Alternative. Its report 
contained, among other things, the results of two interesting partial studies. 
 
Fig. 9. Masterplan Leidsche Rijn (Utrecht, 2011). 
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Fig. 10. Noise levels of the Landtunnel Utrecht using different sets of noise barriers and 
cantilevers, image by TNO (Maxwan, 1998). 
The first study (conducted by TNO) looked at the noise production of the motorway and the 
impact of using different sets of noise barriers and cantilevers. It appeared that the use of a 
two-layered porous asphalt construction in combination with horizontal cantilevers 
promised the best results. 
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Fig. 11. Sloping as a means to integrate the Landtunnel Utrecht at Leidsche Rijn (Maxwan, 
1998). 
The other, somewhat simple, study visualised the use of sloping as a means to integrate the 
‘hollow dike’ with its surrounding area. The study concluded that, along the motorway, a 
slope with an angle of three percent and a length of 210 metres was necessary to minimise 
the impact of the height difference introduced by the physical height of the land tunnel. The 
extensive slope was required to facilitate soft modes of transportation (walking and cycling) 
between the VINEX-development and the city of Utrecht. The exploration also showed that 
a partially submerged tunnel could do with half of that sloping area, or 105 metres. 
8. Green Link A15 
In a parallel process, the municipality of Rotterdam also called for a multifunctional tunnel 
to cover a section of the A15 motorway in 1998: the Green Link. The situation is comparable 
as the A15 separates Rotterdam from its largest VINEX development: Carnisselande. The 
A15 is a section of the Rotterdam Ring that connects the Rotterdam harbour area to its 
hinterland. The municipality of Rotterdam faced a similar line of argument as that by 
Utrecht. The regional Directorate General for Public Works and Water Management (RWS 
Zuid-Holland) told the urban planning department of the Municipality of Rotterdam that a 
tunnel would not be feasible because of the need to transport dangerous goods along the 
A15. RWS Zuid-Holland only allowed small tunnel sections of 80 metres, with a minimal 
spacing of 50 metres between covered sections. Rotterdam called in the support of the Delft 
University of Technology (TU Delft). The city was not convinced that the construction 
proposed by RWS Zuid-Holland could effectively reduce the environmental impact of the 
A15 motorway that had to be extended to five lanes in each direction. It requested an in-
depth investigation into the safety issues regarding motorway tunnels.  The A15 presented 
an ideal showcase. The A15 accommodates an enormous volume of dangerous goods that 
flow directly from the (petro) chemical industry in the Rotterdam Mainport. There are 
200,000 transports yearly, which greatly exceeds the volume that passes Leidsche Rijn. If a 
solution could be found here, it would be a true breakthrough. This pilot programme 
required TU Delft to develop regular exchanges with Rotterdam’s Urban Planning 
Department, the Construction Department of the Directorate General for Public Works and 
Water Management (RWS Bouwdienst) and the Rotterdam Fire Brigade.  
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The Rotterdam Fire Brigade proposed implementing a sprinkler system in the tunnel to rule 
out the development of any scenario that starts with a regular fire and could potentially 
develop into a more severe accident. In addition, TU Delft proposed containing the impact 
of any explosive scenario by physically separating the tunnel’s tubes. Unfortunately the 
models that were used at that time to assess tunnel safety in the Netherlands did not allow 
the incorporation of any claims about the effectiveness of a sprinkler system or an improved 
tunnel tube configuration. Though potentially effective in practice, these measures had no 
impact on the outcome of the assessment itself. To influence the assessment’s outcome, it 
appeared more important to consider the likely, but less extreme, scenarios in which regular 
trucks were involved, such as a ‘large vehicle fire’. Isolating lorries in a separate tube from 
the rest of the traffic results in a notable reduction in the number of deaths due to such 
events, offsetting the increased mortality in the case of unlikely but more extreme events. 
Given that the new tunnels were built on land, it seemed that the potential economic risk 
was manageable as well. In the unlikely scenario that the roof is blown off, the infrastructure 
could be 'easily' repaired. Because urban tunnels are not situated under water, they are 
unlikely to lose their functionality as a small 'polder' (Hoeven, 1999). The RWS Bouwdienst 
provided the calculations and confirmed that the concept was sound (Rijkswaterstaat 
Bouwdienst, 1998). The Rotterdam Fire Brigade formulated requirements for a Category-0 
tunnel. This concept did not ban the transportation of any type of dangerous goods through 
the tunnel but emphasised the necessity of prevention and automated repression 
(Broekhuizen, 1998). 
 
Fig. 12. Green Link A15 (Hoeven, 1999) 
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Although the Green Link was ultimately not built, the publication of the concept by TU 
Delft, including the results of RWS’ own analysis and the Category-0 requirements by the 
Rotterdam Fire Brigade, made it clear for the first time in the Netherlands that transport of 
dangerous goods does not rule out the implementation of multifunctional tunnels. That 
insight was still contested by the Directorate-General for Freight Transport of the Ministry 
of Transport, Public Works and Water Management at that time. The issue continued to 
assert pressure on proposed multifunctional tunnels, such as the Landtunnel Utrecht. 
9. Weighing five alternatives followed by a final concept revision 
In the year 2000, new EU regulations on air quality were introduced and caused a stir in the 
Netherlands. Much of the country suffered from high levels of background pollution that 
were near or above the future limits set by the EU. Those limits were easily exceeded near 
major motorways or other sources of air pollution. The technology institute TNO delivered 
the first set of air quality calculations (nitrogen dioxide and particulate matter) for the A2 
based on the new requirements. The calculations showed that wider than expected areas 
along the open parts of the land tunnel at Leidsche Rijn could not be used for residential 
purposes. This would mean a significant breach of the urban quality of the area and an 
undesirable decrease in the number of housing units that could be built. The municipality of 
Utrecht, the project bureau Leidsche Rijn, RWS and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment jointly commissioned a study by ARCADIS and the 
Architectengroep. The final report of that study was delivered in December 2001 (Brouwer, 
Rijnboutt, 2001). Three partial studies by TNO and ARCADIS were included in the study 
that investigated air pollution, safety and noise. The study unexpectedly concluded that 
noise was the environmental impact with the largest consequences for land use in Leidsche 
Rijn, rather than air quality or safety. The ARCADIS/Architectengroep study evaluated five 
alternatives: 1] the original 'Creative Alternative', 2] the 'Creative Alternative' with 
horizontal cantilevers over the road, 3] an alternative that covered only the northern part of 
the alignment, 4] an alternative based on short tunnels with lengths of just 80 metres, 5] a 
fully covered surface tunnel. 
 
Fig. 13. Alternatives 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (van der Hoeven, 2010). 
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The new air quality assessment by TNO provided detailed insight in the diffusion of the 
emissions in the project area (TNO MEP, 2001). With more experience under the new 
regulations and an adjusted value for the background emission, each of the alternatives 
seemed to keep the nitrogen dioxide values below 40 µg/m3 at a distance of 50 metres from 
the road. Only the 1650-m long full-length tunnel (alternative 5) showed a small area where 
emissions peaked at 41 µg/m3. Presented in this chapter are the nitrogen dioxide diagrams 
for alternatives 1, 2, 3 and 5. Alternative 4 is not presented because it was not evaluated in 
the TNO study. TNO calculated emission levels at distances of 50 and 100 metres from the 
road. No calculations were made for the area above the tunnel. The fact that no emissions 
are displayed here does not mean that the area is not exposed. The impact of the noise 
barriers was taken into account in the study. 
 
Fig. 14. Calculated nitrogen dioxide emissions alternatives 1, 2, 3 and 5 (van der Hoeven, 
2010). 
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Wind does seem to have an impact, which can be seen in the higher concentrations on the 
east side of all alternatives. The length of the tunnel matters as well. The concentration of air 
pollution at the ends of the tunnel increases as the tunnel becomes longer. Two walls 
separate in alternative 2 the inside lanes from the outside lanes. The inside lanes, designed 
for local traffic, are fully covered by the cantilevers and, with the addition of the wall, 
effectively enclosed in a 1650 meters long tunnel. Compared to alternative 1, this results in 
increased emissions at the tunnel's ends, and reduced emissions near the open sections. 
Alternative 3 contains 40-meter high buildings bordering the open sections of the motorway; 
this alternative effectively reduces the air pollution without creating peak concentrations 
like those at the other end of the tunnel. 
A safety assessment was conducted by ARCADIS (ARCADIS, 2001). The ARCADIS study 
concludes that the existing laws and regulations, as well as the framework used in the 
assessment do not pose a major obstacle for any of the five alternatives. In all alternatives, 
the group risk that users of the motorway tunnel collectively faced stayed well below the 
indicative norm of 10-2/N2, despite the transport of LPG. 
TNO converted its 1998 noise assessment into contours that could be displayed on maps 
that enabled TNO to calculate the surface of the area affected by noise levels of 50 and 55 dB 
(TNO TPD, 2001). An overview of the impact of the five alternatives on the surface of the 
development area, the loss of real estate revenue, and the loss of the number of housing 
units is presented. These figures belong to the 55 dB contours that require the maximal legal 
exemption from the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing and the Environment. The 
figures that belong to the 50 dB contours are considerably larger. 
 
Fig. 15. Table indicating lost development area, lost housing units and lost real estate 
revenue because of noise levels that exceed the 55 dB limit for each alternative (van der 
Hoeven, 2010). 
The study also provided investment figures. The differences in the construction costs of the 
alternatives appear to be relatively small. The original Creative Alternative was estimated to 
cost 460 M€, while the optimised Creative Alternative (using horizontal cantilevers, as 
favoured by the Projectbureau Leidsche Rijn) was estimated to cost 501 M€ to build. A fully 
covered surface tunnel required an additional 10 M€ for a total of 511 M€. The fully covered 
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surface tunnel would allow more residential area to be developed than the other alternatives 
and less development area was exposed to noise levels over 50 and 55 dB. RWS ruled out 
residential development above the 13-hectare large tunnel surface, unlike the Donau-ufer 
Autobahn in Vienna. The full-length tunnel was, nevertheless, able to generate higher 
income for real estate development. Effectively, the financial differences between the 
optimised Creative Alternative (alternative 2) and the fully covered surface tunnel 
(alternative 5) disappeared altogether. The financial difference between the original Creative 
Alternative (alternative 1) and the fully covered surface tunnel was reduced to less than ten 
percent. 
 
Fig. 16. Table indicating lost real estate revenue (55 dB), the required road investment and 
the sum of road investment and lost revenue for each alternative (van der Hoeven, 2010). 
ARCADIS and the Architectengroep advised the decision takers to opt for any of the first 
three alternatives. They ruled out the alternative of a series of short tunnels that only 
covered a length of 80 metres because of its lacking spatial quality and the emission levels, 
although the TNO report did not explore this option. They also ruled out the fully covered 
surface tunnel because it was considered undesirable from the safety point of view, 
although the ARCADIS the report did not provide research-based evidence to substantiate 
such a claim. 
In 2002, the government and the municipality of Utrecht reached a deal based on an 
optimised version of the Creative Alternative. The project's costs were finally assessed at 535 
M€. The Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management agreed to pay 323 M€. 
The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment contributed 99 M€. The 
municipality, region and province of Utrecht agreed to add 83 M€ to the project's budget. 
Saving in other areas of the project generated an additional 30 M€. The landscaping of the 
surface tunnel's surrounding area could be realised with less excessive sloping 
(Nieuwsbank, 2002). 
In 2006, just before the start of construction, the Directorate General for Public Works and 
Water Management and the municipality of Utrecht revised the tunnel concept one last time 
as they agreed to build a fully covered tunnel, without referring to potential safety or air 
quality issues. Meanwhile, an agreement was reached with the LPG sector to increase the 
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fire resistance of the trucks that deliver LPG to gas stations, which reduces the likelihood of 
accidents involving these transports (Infrasite, 2006). The background levels of nitrogen 
dioxide and particulate matter were declining as a result of the imposed measures to meet 
the new European limits. 
10. Friend or foe? 
The final outcome of the Landtunnel Utrecht development may surprise. The urban 
planners of Maxwan had sided with the local authority of Utrecht for over a decade (1995-
2006) in a continuous struggle with the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management in order to achieve the Masterplan Leidsche Rijn as it was originally 
envisioned. It faced sustained opposition from that Ministry. The Ministry however is 
responsible for many policy objectives and comprises many departments. Maxwan and 
Utrecht may have failed to recognise who is foe and who is friend in this large organisation. 
In the discussions the author had with the urban planners of Maxwan it became clear that 
the classic polarity of municipality versus ministry dominated their viewpoint. 
The author was in 2000 consulted by the project manager of the regional Directorate General 
for Public Works and Water Management, responsible for the widening of the A2. The 
project manager was transparent about the fact that he opposed the overall concept of the 
Masterplan Leidsche Rijn. In his eyes Utrecht's compact city policy was little more than a 
strategy to annex its neighbouring municipality Vleuten-De Meern. However, once it would 
be decided to built the Landtunnel Utrecht, he felt it should be done properly as a fully 
covered tunnel. It should not be broken up in smaller segments or just be partially covered. 
The author was not at liberty to share this information with Maxwan or Utrecht. 
The Construction Department of the Directorate General for Public Works and Water 
Management had initially raised the red flag regarding safety. The director of that 
Department, Rinus Olierook, chaired during this time a committee that had to initiate a 
large scale programme investigating multifunctional land use, a programme that would 
later become Habiforum. He recognised Leidsche Rijn as a perfect showcase of that 
principle. He made that clear in an interview that was published by the author. 
11. The bigger picture 
Looking backwards the task to unite the different viewpoints in order to reach an joint 
agreement seemed less daunting than the decade of moving back and fourth may suggest. 
What could have caused it to take so long? The introduction of this chapter sketched the 
larger context in which the spatial developments in the Randstad took place. The latest stage 
in that development (VINEX) was a time in which the larger cities like Utrecht, The Hague 
and Rotterdam, and smaller cities such as Eindhoven, Amersfoort and Delft broke free from 
the boundaries that the 1970s motorway network had imposed on them. The urban footprint 
of these cities expanded over the motorways. With that the network that was carefully 
planned to bypass cities became part of many urban areas. 
The fight that enfolded in the case of Leidsche Rijn focused on details such as noise, air 
pollution and safety. That fight may not have been fought so hard if it did not represent a 
more fundamental discussion on accessibility. The motorway network was the designated 
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network that would facilitate unrestricted transport of all goods and persons in all thinkable 
volumes. The dense grid of motorways that planners had drawn to accommodate the 
growing traffic was not built. Instead traffic concentrated on a few major corridors. Building 
homes and workplaces in these corridors exposed the population to their environmental 
impact. The major concern voiced by infrastructure planners was that the environmental 
impact could require that restrictions were imposed on specific goods and the volumes of 
vehicles that used these corridors. The construction of a tunnel represented more than just a 
local solution. Policy makers wrote in this context literally about the precedence and the 
irreversibility of such a solution. Unintended Leidsche Rijn may have become the poster boy 
of a more generic planning challenge in the Randstad. 
Once the struggle was decided and it became clear that city and infrastructure had to life 
together, the length of the tunnel or its cover no longer mattered.  
 
Fig. 17. Artist rendering of the Landtunnel Utrecht at Leidsche Rijn (Maxwan, 2009). 
12. Conclusion: A first of its kind 
The construction of the Landtunnel Utrecht at Leidsche Rijn signals the changing relation 
between the planning of infrastructure and the development of urban areas, as well as the 
coming of age of the Dutch multifunctional tunnel. With few references to fall back on, it 
took the involved stakeholders almost a decade (1995-2006) to agree that the environmental 
impact of an expanded A2 motorway required a landtunnel in order to develop Leidsche 
Rijn into a high-quality residential area for 30,000 homes. All stakeholders had to go 
through a collective learning process before they realised this fact. Environmental issues 
were intertwined with safety and financial issues for a long time, until a deal was reached 
on the project financing. 
After more than a decade, it was decided in 2006 to construct the Landtunnel Utrecht as a 
1650-m full-length covered tunnel, which resembles closely the initial concept that was 
included in the 1995 Master Plan. The path-finding process that took place between 1995 
and 2006 required a unique and in-depth investigation into the interaction between (partly) 
covered tunnelling concepts, safety issues, noise production, air quality, financing, and 
urban development. Not all decisions were made according to the evidence that was 
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produced in the process. The overall investigation can, nevertheless, be used as an evidence-
based reference for the next generation of multifunctional tunnels in the Netherlands and 
abroad. It made clear that the motorway network in the Randstad had become an integral 
part of its built environment and that this fact requires new concepts and solutions. 
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